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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND SELF-
REGULATION OF THE SECURITIES LAWYER
JAMES H. CHEEK, III*
It is no longer wildly shocking to suggest that attorneys involved
in matters concerning the federal securities laws may have substan-
tial responsibilities and liabilities to the investing public in addition
to those which are owed to their clients. The notoriety of the com-
plaint filed by the Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commis-
sion") against prestigeous law firms in the National Student
Marketing case' and the immediate and extensive reaction thereto
2
have made all lawyers keenly aware of, and concerned with, the direc-
tion in which professional responsibility seems to be headed. The
Commission is without question committed to the proposition that
the lawyer representing clients in securities transactions must, in
certain circumstances, act as an "independent public attorney"
whose standard of conduct must reflect and protect the interests of
the investing public.
3
While the pros and cons of these expanding responsibilities for the
attorney are ably presented in the remarkable number of recent and
*Member, Tennessee Bar; Lecturer in Law, Vanderbilt University. Member, Ten-
nessee Bar. A.B. (1964), Duke University; J.D. (1967), Vanderbilt University; L.L.M.
(1968), Harvard University.
'SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., [1971-72 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED.SEC.L.REP. 93,360 (D.D.C., filed Feb. 3, 1972). It must be remembered that this
action is still pending and the issues have not been adjudicated to date, and no
decisions presently exist which support the position urged by the Commission in its
complaint.
'See, e.g., Green, "Irate Attorneys," Wall St.J. Feb. 15, 1972, at 1, col. 1; Editorial,
"The SEC Finds Some Worthy New Targets," Fortune, March 1972, at 46; Karmel,
Attorneys' Securities Law Liabilities, 27 Bus. LAW. 1153 (1972); Whistle-Blowing, BNA
SEC. REG. & L. REP, No. 156, A-1 to A-7 (June 14, 1972); Cheek, Potential Liability of
Counsel Named in a Prospectus, 6 REV. OF SEC. REG. 939 (1973); Shipman, The Need
for SEC Rules to Govern the Duties and Civil Liabilities of Attorneys and the Federal
Securities Statutes, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 231 (1973); Freeman, Opinion Letters and
Professionalism, 1973 DUKE L.J. 371.
'While to some extent this view was expressed earlier, it is only recently that the
Commission has actively pursued this policy via speeches, articles, and administrative
and judicial proceedings. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 4445 (Feb. 2, 1962);
Sommer, The Emerging Responsibilities of the Securities Lawyer, [1973-74 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED.SEc.L.REP. 79,631 (1974); Sommer, The Commission and the Bar:
Forty Good Years, 30 Bus.LAW. 5 (1974); Garrett, New Directions in Professional
Responsibility, 29 Bus.LAw. 7 (Spec. Issue 1974); Sonde, The Responsibility of Profes-
sionals Under the Federal Securities Laws-Some Observations, 68 Nw. L. REV. 1
(1973); In re Emanuel Fields, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5404 (June 18, 1973).
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varied articles on the subject,4 few positive and pragmatic responses
to this critical problem area for the securities lawyer have been devel-
oped. Yet surely now - before the responsibilities being urged by the
Commission are crystalized and established by some court as princi-
ples of law - is the time for the legal profession to take the initiative
and after thorough study formulate standards of professional conduct
which realistically respond to the Commission's position and the
problems flowing therefrom. If such professional self-regulation is not
forthcoming, then by default we of the bar leave the development of
our standards of culpability and the ultimate policing of our mistakes
wholly to the Commission whose advocacy for the public trust seem-
ingly overrides all other policies, and to the courts where distasteful
litigation of hard facts before an unsophisticated judge often makes
bad law. This article examines briefly the justifications for and po-
tential difficulties of these new responsibilities being urged by the
Commission, as well as the resulting liabilities which may arise for
the securities lawyer, both under the federal securities laws and tradi-
tional malpractice concepts. It then seeks to formulate in a general
sense a workable and meaningful response thereto which is consistent
with the professional role of the securities attorney.
I. THE PRESSURES BEHIND INCREASING PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY
For almost 40 years, attorneys practiced under the federal securi-
ties laws without the spotlight being focused on their obligations to
the investing public. This is not to say that such obligations never
existed or were being totally ignored; but until recently, no one, in-
cluding the Commission, viewed these obligations as placing the se-
4The most comprehensive and thoughtful treatment of this subject matter is found
in the series of articles published as ABA National Institute, Proceedings, Advisors to
Management - Responsibilities and Liabilities of Lawyers and Accountants, 30
BuS.LAw. 1 (Spec. Issue 1975) [hereinafter cited as National Institute]. For other
useful articles, see Lowenfels, Expanding Public Responsibilities of Securities Law-
yers: An Analysis of the New Trend in Standard of Care and Priorities of Duties, 74
COLUM. L. REV. 412 (1974); Lipman, The SEC's Reluctant Police Force: A New Role
for Lawyers, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 (1974); Johnson, The Expanding Responsibilities
of Attorneys in Practice Before the SEC, 25 TEMPLE L.Q. 637 (1974); Derieux, Public
Accountability under Securities Laws, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 255 (1974); Small, An Attor-
ney's Responsibilities Under Federal and State Securities Laws: Private Counselor or
Public Servant?, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1189 (1973); Freeman, Opinion Letters and
Professionalism, 1973 DUKE L.J. 371 (1973); Shipman, The Need for SEC Rules to
Govern the Duties and Civil Liabilities of Attorneys and the Federal Securities
Statutes, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 371 (1973).
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curities lawyer in the role of an independent public attorney.5
Historically, the bar and the Commission have worked together
with an unusual degree of mutual respect and cooperation which has
exhibited a "give and take" attitude on both sides. Much of the
success experienced by securities regulation in the last 40 years is
attributable to the continuing policy of the Commission to consult
with members of the bar and the securities industry with respect to
overall policy decisions, as well as specific rules, in a common effort
to devise policies and rules which will most effectively achieve the
goals of the federal securities laws within the existing economic and
social climate. In working with the Commission, the securities bar
has been remarkably objective in its approach and has generally dem-
onstrated a keen sensitivity of the public interest. Moreover, most
securities practitioners reflect that sensitivity in their response to the
many judgment questions which arise in practice from the securities
transactions contemplated by their clients. Yet, within the last sev-
eral years, the Commission has apparently decided that the sensitiv-
ity exhibited by the bar is not adequate and that attorneys must
assume a more active role as guardians of the public interest.
One must wonder what factors underlie this abrupt shift in the
thinking of the Commission. Commissioner Sommer suggests that
the increased public responsibilities urged by the Commission flow
from and are consistent with "the pervading judicial and legislative
concern for the interests of the consumer."' While it is true that
interest in consumer protection is at its highest level today, that
protection has to date not been achieved by imposing responsibilities
and liabilities upon the attorney for the vendor. The attorney-
draftsman of an unconscionable contract, or of instruments which fail
to comply with certain consumer laws or which result in an adverse
and illegal effects upon consumers may be liable to his client, but
there has been no judicial or legislative movement toward making
him liable to the consumer misled or harmed by those instruments.
Surely more pressing forces exist for the Commission's recent actions;
and most likely those forces find their genesis in the Commission's
frustration with its inability to protect the financial community from
Traditionally, even the Commission asserted that the primary duty of the securi-
ties lawyer acting as counsel was owed to his client, not the investing public; and thus
it was only when the attorney's role was not that of counsel but that of an active
participant in a stock fraud that liabilities or sanctions would be imposed. See Ameri-
can Finance Company, 40 S.E.C. 1043, 1044 (1962) (attorney's principal concern is
with the "interests and rights of his client"); note 29 infra and cases cited therein.
'Sommer, The Emerging Responsibilities of the Securities Lawyer, [1973-74
Transfer Binder] CCH FED.SEC.L.REP. 79,631, at 83,689 (1974).
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the "monstrous financial debacles" which have occurred in the last
few years.7 With its enforcement division constantly reacting to pre-
viously committed frauds, rather than preventing their occurrence,
the Commission apparently has concluded that its system as a whole,
and its enforcement branch in particular, is generally impotent to
prevent the inception and execution of huge frauds upon the invest-
ing public.' Thus, the Commission is forced to examine other alterna-
tives, and presently its plan seems to be to increase the public's
protective screen against the imposition of fraudulent schemes by
consciously placing extreme pressure upon the professionals involved
in securities transactions and thus to intensify their focus upon pro-
tecting the public interest.'
'The most notorious of these frauds have involved Penn Central, Equity Funding,
National Student Marketing, Republic National Life Insurance Company, IOS, Ltd.,
Stirling Homex, Home-Stake Production, Four Seasons, Performance Systems, Inc.,
and Westec. See speech by Chairman Garrett, Professional Responsibility and the
Securities Laws, State Bar of Texas, July 4, 1974.
'The lack of staff and money are, of course, very real problems in the Commission's
efforts to prevent frauds. As Chairman Garrett recently stated in his Texas speech:
About 34%, or 652 people, are devoted to fraud prevention - that is,
enforcement. But this doesn't mean we have 652 cops on the beat -
that number includes enforcement's full administrative slice. We
have, at best, half that number of lawyers and investigators, nation-
wide.
Id. Yet if the need exists - as surely it does - the Commission should go to Congress
and lobby for a greater budget for enforcement to raise its capabilities to the levels
required to do its statutorily-directed job. In lieu of those efforts it should not seek to
impose upon the bar the duties which Congress directed the Commission to carry out.
'Chairman Garrett expressed this program most clearly in his recent Texas speech,
supra note 7, as follows:
In fact, any well organized scheme of violation almost surely involves
cooperative participation by such professionals [lawyers and accoun-
tants]. Simply as a matter of enforcement technique, if we can induce
the professionals to be less cooperative, we will prevent many viola-
tions that would otherwise occur. And what are the available means
to bring this about? Exhortation, injunctive actions and Rule 2(e)
disbarment proceedings. The Commission has adopted a conscious
program to improve professional performance by the use of these
means. Even if certain businessmen are not moved to fear compliance
by ethical considerations or the fear of punishment, they will do far
less damage if their lawyers and accountants won't play. This is our
policy objective. But, of course, we must seek it only through already
supportable means as provided by law.
The Chairman's statement seems to be addressed to the intentional, hard-core fraud
cases where "cooperative participation" means active and willful participation in
fraudulent schemes. If so limited, few professionals would disagree with the Chair-
man's position. The area of disagreement and concern arises only if "cooperative
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
It is easy to over-react to the rhetoric and actions of the Commis-
sion, especially since the other direct sources of pressure upon the
standards and actions of lawyers - the courts and the organized bar
- have not to date acted with the same zeal or in the same revolu-
tionary manner as the Commission. Yet the specter of horrendous
civil liability which conceivably could flow from the Commission's
position should not be accepted as a fait accompli, and careful con-
sideration of actual case law and the present ethical positions of the
organized bar should be made before standards of professional con-
duct in this area are formulated to deal with the Commission's pro-
grammed offensive on professionals.
II. STANDARDS UNDER PRESSURE CASE LAW
A. The Common Law
Under common law principles, the lawyer has traditionally been
liable-to his client if he fails to possess and use such skill, prudence
and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity commonly
possess and exercise in the performance of the tasks which they un-
dertake."0 The attorney is not required to be an insurer of results, nor
a guarantor of the correctness of his work," but must exercise only
ordinary skill and diligence. Courts have generally been reluctant to
hold a legal specialist to a higher standard of care. However, since
legal specialization is increasingly recognized by the bar and the
public,' 2 it is likely that as in the medical profession, if one under-
participation" includes cases of poor judgment or advice where doubts are resolved in
favor of a client on such close questions as "materiality" or the definition of"underwri-
ter," and when with the benefit of hindsight it appears that such unintentional conduct
aided the perpetration of a Rule 10b-5 violation. If in fact the Commission intends its
"policy" to reach these situations - as the National Student Marketing complaint
suggests it does - then the Commission far exceeds the "supportable means as pro-
vided by law" and seeks to establish new law where the primary duty of the securities
lawyer runs directly to the investing public in favor of whom all doubts must be
resolved.
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299 (1965). An action for damages for the
breach of this standard may be grounded on tort or contract law, but there are few
questions where the form of action is likely to affect the result. For detailed studies of
the standard and its application, see Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence,
12 VAND. L. REv. 755 (1959); Note, Attorney Malpractice, 63 COLUM. L. Rv. 1292
(1963); Note, Professional Negligence, 121 U.PA. L. REv. 627 (1973).
"See, e.g., Doff v. Relles, 355 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1966); Denzer v. Rouse, 48 Wis.
2d 528, 180 N.W.2d 521 (1970); Cook v. Irion, 409 S.W.2d 475 (Tex.Civ.App. 1966);
Hill v. Mynatt, 59 S.W. 163 (Tenn.Ch.App. 1900).
"Both the California and New Mexico bars now certify members of their bars as
specialists in certain fields, and nine other states, including New York and Texas, are
19751
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takes to act as a specialist, he will be held to the legal skill and
knowledge commonly possessed by such specialists. 3
Even if the attorney fails to meet the requisite standard of care,
in the absence of fraud or gross negligence, 4 he historically has been
shielded from liability to anyone other than his client by the bar of
privity. 5 But no longer can that principle be safely relied upon by the
negligent lawyer. A series of recent cases have clearly lifted the bar
of privity to permit recoveries by third parties, at least where they
are members of a small and limited class, such as the intended bene-
ficiaries under a negligently drawn will whose individual reliance was
specifically foreseen by the negligent attorney. 6 Other cases, primar-
ily involving accountants, have gone even further and suggested that
liability for negligence extends to all persons who, although not them-
selves foreseen, are members of a class which the accountants should
have foreseen would rely. 7 Further support for the extension of liabil-
currently considering the adoption of similar programs. Similarly, new law lists sanc-
tioned by the American Bar Association are being compiled based on the attorney's
stated specialty. See, e.g., ATTORNEY LISTINGS OF LAWYER-TO-LAwYER CONSULTATION
PANEL (2d ed. 1974).
'MCf. SEC v. Management Dynamics Inc., CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 95,017 (2d Cir.
1975). Similarly, courts have not applied a "community standard" as is often applied
in medical malpractice suits. Implicit in those decisions is the questionable theory that
the ordinary attorney possesses the same skill and knowledge regardless of where he
may practice. This may be another area of the law which may develop in the future.
"Such conduct would provide a basis for an action by a third party in tort for
deceit. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, 685-86 (4th ed. 1971). See Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 179, 186, 174 N.E. 441, 444, 447 (1931); Maneri v. Amodeo, 38
Misc. 2d 190, 238 N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup.Ct. 1963). Cf. Duro Sportswear, Inc. v. Cogen,
258 App.Div. 867, 137 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1955); State St. Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104,
15 N.E.2d 416 (1938).
"This view was first expressed by the Supreme Court in National Savings Bank
v. Ward, 100 U.S. 105 (1879). See also Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng.Rep. 402 (Ex.
1842).
"6These cases have generally applied a flexible balancing test to determine liabil-
ity. Among the key factors considered are the extent to which the attorney owed a duty
to the third party, the foreseeability of reliance by that party, the closeness of causal
connection between his negligence and the injury, and a balancing of the policies of
preventing future harm and compensating the third parties with that of imposing an
undue burden on the profession. See, e.g., Woodford v. Sanders, 248 So. 2d 419
(La.App. 1971); Donald v. Garry, 19 Cal. App. 3d 769, 97 Cal. Rptr. 191 (Dist.Ct.App.
1971); Heyer v. Flaig, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225, 449 P.2d 161 (1969); Licata v. Spector, 26
Conn.Supp. 378, 225 A.2d 28 (1966); Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685
(1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962); Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d
16 (1958). See generally Attorneys - Liability to Third Parties, 45 A.L.R.3d 1181
(1972).
"2See, e.g., Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l . Bank v. Swartz, 455 F.2d 847 (4th
Cir. 1972); Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968); Aluma Kraft
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ity to third parties exists in proposed § 552 of the Restatement of
Torts which makes one liable to a person or a group (no matter how
large) whose reliance upon incorrect information was known or ex-
pected."8
Operating against this extension of liability for years has been the
fear of imposing excessive liability upon the profession, and despite
the recent trend to the contrary, some courts continue to apply the
privity requirement and thereby refuse to extend the negligent law-
yer's liability beyond his client. 9 This commitment to privity to pro-
tect professionals from widespread liability for careless error finds its
roots in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche,2" in which Judge Cardozo re-
fused to extend the liability of accountants to third party creditors
whose reliance on negligently prepared financial statements was
found to be unforeseen in fact, though reliance by some creditor was
or should have been foreseen. Judge Cardozo raised as a policy base
for his decision the specter of horrendous liabilities:"
Mfg. Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co., 493 S.W.2d 378 (Mo.Ct.App. 1973); Shatterproof Glass
Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873 (Tex.Civ.App. 1971); Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395
(Iowa 1969). Accord, Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974); cert.
granted, - U.S. _, 43 U.S.L.W. 3550 (U.S. Apr. 14, 1975).
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (Tent.Draft No. 12, 1966), reads as fol-
lows:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession, or employment
... supplies false information for the guidance of others in their
business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused
to them by their justifiable reliance upon such information, if he fails
to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communi-
cating the information.
(2) Except as stated in subsection (3), the liability stated in subsec-
tion (1) is limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of the persons for whose benefit and guidance
he intends to supply the information, or knows that the recipient
intends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction which he intends the
information to influence, or knows that the recipient so intends, or in
a substantially similar transaction....
This section has been recently cited with approval as representing a compromise be-
tween a narrow view of Ultramares and unlimited extension of liability to all third
parties. Bunge Corp. v. Eide, 372 F. Supp. 1058 (D.N.D. 1974).
"See, e.g., Koch Industries, Inc. v. Vosko, 494 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1974); Stephens
Industries v. Haskins & Sells, 438 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1971); MacNerland v. Barnes,
199 S.E.2d 564 (Ga.Ct.App. 1973); Investment Corp. v. Buchman, 208 So.2d 291 (Fla.
1968); Maneri v. Amodeo, 38 Misc. 2d 190, 238 N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup. Ct. 1963). Cf. Bunge
v. Eide, 372 F. Supp. 1058 (D.N.D. 1974); Milliner v. Fox & Co., CCH BLuE SKY L.REP.
71,178 (Utah Sup.Ct. 1974).
255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
21Id. at 448. For a proposed legislative solution to the problems of horrendous
1975]
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If liability for negligence exists, a faultless slip or blunder,
failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of decep-
tive entries, may expose the accountants to liability in an inde-
terminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indetermi-
nate class. The hazards of a business conducted on these terms
are so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not
exist in the implication of a duty that exposes one to these
consequences ....
Liability for negligence if adjudged in this case will extend
to many callings, other than auditors. Lawyers who certify
their opinions as to the validity of municipal or corporate
bonds with knowledge that the opinion will be brought to the
notice of the public, will become liable to the investors, if they
overlook the statute or decision, to the same extent as if the
controversy were one between the client and advisor ....
These illustrations may seem to be extreme, but they go little,
if any, farther than we are invited to go now. . . . The law
does not spread its protection so far.
Although over 40 years have passed since Ultramares and several
cases have directly challenged the wisdom of the decision," reports
of the demise of its underlying policy are greatly exaggerated." -'
There still is no case involving a negligent attorney which extends
liability under traditional malpractice concepts beyond a small group
of specifically known reliants to a group as large and remote as the
investing public. Moreover, the cases imposing liability have gener-
ally involved areas of practice where the law is more clearly developed
than securities law and thus minimal levels of care and skill can be
more certainly determined. Nevertheless, one cannot ignore the dan-
ger signals flowing from the recent accounting cases and the Re-
liability, see ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE §§ 1402-06 (Tent. Draft Nos. 1-3 Revised,
1974) (limiting liability to $100,000 per defendant).
nRusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968) ("Ultramares con-
stitutes an unwarranted inroad upon the principle that 'the risk reasonably to be
perceived defines the duty to be obeyed.' "); Rhode Island Hospital Trust Nat'l Bank
v. Swartz, 455 F.2d 847 (4th Cir. 1972).
2.IThe continued vitality of the policies expressed in Ultramares is clearly seen in
the recent Blue Chip Stamps case where the Supreme Court cites Ultramares and its
policies with approval. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, - U.S. - , 43
U.S.L.W. 4707, 4714 (U.S. June 10, 1975).
"See cases cited in note 17 supra. For a superb analysis of these cases and the
problem of accountant's liability to third parties, see Fiflis, Current Problems of Ac-
countants' Responsibilities to Third Parties, 28 VAND. L. REv. 31 (1975). See also
Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 979 (1973).
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
statement's proposed position, particularly since the rendering of se-
curities law opinions" and the drafting of disclosure documents ar-
guably involve large groups of third parties who may be specifically
unknown but who could reasonably be expected or foreseen by coun-
sel to rely upon his skill and care in rendering such opinions or in
drafting such documents. The bar should react to these signals by
formulating standards in these areas, since good faith compliance
with such professional standards would clearly meet the requisite
standard of care under the common law, even if such third party
actions are permitted.
B. The Federal Securities Laws
1. The Judicial Decisions.
Except to a limited extent under Section 11 of the Securities Act
of 1933,25 the federal securities laws do not impose any specific liabili-
ties or responsibilities on attorneys as such. Yet lawyers clearly are
not exempt from the civil liability and anti-fraud provisions of those
laws" and indeed have been held liable thereunder for conduct in
21Opinions would relate to such matters as municipal bonds, mergers, public offer-
ings, titles, audits and the sale of unregistered stock. If a third party with the attorney's
consent or knowing acquiescence receives copies or summaries of such opinions (as in
a prospectus), it would not seem unreasonable to extend his liability if the opinion was
negligently rendered. The more troublesome question arises when the third party never
sees the opinion or a summary of it yet is within a group (such as the investing public)
who clearly should have been foreseen by the attorney as indirect beneficiaries of and
reliants upon the attorney's skill and care in rendering the opinion. The policy of
Ultramares would seem to have greater force to limit liability in this situation. See
Freeman, Opinion Letters and Professionalism, 1973 DUKE L.J. 371, 387-96. See
generally Jennings, The Corporate Lawyer's Responsibilities and Liabilities in Pending
Legal Opinions, National Institute, supra note 4, at 73-80.
"Such documents include prospectuses, the 1934 Act reports, proxy statements
and perhaps the Annual Report to Stockholders. The element of known reliance may
be particularly troublesome in the prospectus situation where loose language is often
used in connection with counsel's name. See Cheek, Potential Liability of a Counsel
Named in a Prospectus, 6 REv. OF SEc.REG. 939 (1973). See generally Small, The
Lawyer's Responsibility as a Draftsman, National Institute, supra note 4, at 81-89.
"i5 U.S.C. § 77K (1933). Under this section, liability (subject to a due diligence
defense) may attach to the lawyer as an "expert" with respect to his opinion on the
legality of the securities offered (Exhibit 6 to the Form S-i) and as to those legal
matters which he is named in the prospectus as having passed upon. No case has to
date considered this question. See Cheek, Potential Liability of a Counsel Named in
a Prospectus, 6 REv OF SEc.REG. 939, 942-43 (1973).
"rhese provisions are principally § 12(2) and § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933
and Rule 10b-5 promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. For a detailed
outline of the whole spectrum of the liabilities of lawyers, see Matthews, Liabilities of
1975]
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connection with a fraudulent securities transaction. Very few cases,
however, have involved civil damage claims by non-clients, and no
court has held a negligent attorney civilly liable for damages to the
investing public where his role was strictly limited to that of an
attorney. 8
Most cases holding counsel liable under the federal securities laws
have involved civil injunctive actions under Rule 10b-5 where the
attorney was a knowing and active participant in a fraudulent securi-
ties transaction, 9 or situations where the attorney was a director or
"insider" which status imposed higher responsibilities upon him than
if his only relation to the company were that of counsel." Where the
Lawyers Under the Federal Securities Laws, National Institute, supra note 4, at 110-
155.
"A number of complaints based upon negligent conduct of attorneys qua attorneys
have been filed by classes whose members might be deemed the relevant "investing
public," but these cases either have been settled or are still pending. It is revealing
that many of the settlements of these cases have been based upon an assumed exposure
to such large classes.
"See, e.g., SEC v. Universal Major Industries Corp., - F. Supp. - (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (knowing use of erroneous opinion letters to further distribution of unregistered
stock); SEC v. Century Inv. Transfer Corp., CCH FED.SEc.L.REP. 93,232 (S.D.N.Y.
1971) (knowing use of clearly erroneous opinion letters relating to distribution of unre-
gistered securities); United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1009 (1972) (attorney materially involved in all business steps of unlawful
hypothecation); Blakely v. Lisac, 357 F. Supp. 255 (D. Ore. 1972) (attorney-director
liable for errors in prospectus and annual report as role was "beyond a lawyer's normal
one"); Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1969) (attorney played major
role in most aspects of illegal solicitation); SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc. [1973-
74 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.SEc.L.REP. 94,468, aff'd in part, CCH FED.SEC.L.REP.
95,017 (2d Cir. 1975) (attorney actively involved in all activities of shell corporation
which illegally sold stock); United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1964)
(active non-legal participation plus clearly erroneous opinions); United States v.
Crosby, 294 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1961) (active fraudulent selling by attorney and know-
ingly rendering clearly erroneous opinions). As an analytical matter, liability in these
cases was imposed because the attorney was found to be either a primary wrongdoer
who owed a direct duty to the plaintiff or an "aider and abettor" who actively and
knowingly assisted a primary wrongdoer. See generally Ruder, Multiple Defendants in
Securities Law Fraud Cases, 120 U. PA. L. Rav. 598 (1972). Contra, Hochfelder v.
Midwest Stock Exch., 503 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1974) (certain types of inaction are
sufficient to sustain charge of aiding and abetting).
3 See, e.g., Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544
(E.D.N.Y. 1971); Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
Although counsel was not held liable as an attorney in these § 11 cases, the fact that
the defendants were attorneys resulted in a substantially higher standard of care being
placed upon them than was placed on their fellow outside directors. Accord, Blakely
v. Lisac, 357 F. Supp. 255 (D. Ore. 1972). See generally Lawyers as Directors, National
Institute, supra note 4, at 41-64.
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
attorney's conduct was limited to acting purely as a professional ad-
viser to his client, courts have generally refused to impose liability.'
A key case involving counsel's exposure to 10b-5 liability is SEC
v. Frank,2 a civil injunctive suit brought by the SEC under Section
17(a) of the 1933 Act as well as under Rule 10b-5 against a lawyer for
his participation in the preparation of a false and misleading offering
circular used in an intrastate offering. The attorney's defense was
that the portion of the offering circular alleged to contain the misre-
presentations had been prepared by the officers of the issuer and that
his sole function had been that of a scrivener helping them to place
their ideas in proper form. Although reversing an order granting in-
junctive relief on an evidentiary point, the Second Circuit rejected
defendant's substantive position:
In our complex society the accountant's certificate and the
lawyer's opinion can be instruments for inflicting pecuniary
loss more potent than the chisel or the crowbar." A lawyer has
no privilege to assist in circulating a statement with regard to
securities that he knows to be false simply because his client
has furnished it to him. At the other extreme, it would be
unreasonable to hold a lawyer who was putting his client's
description of a chemical process into understandable English
to be guilty of fraud simply because of his failure to detect
discrepancies between their description and technical reports
available to him in a physical sense but beyond his ability to
understand. . . .[If even a non-expert, however, would recog-
nize the falsity of the representations in such a report,] the
Commission would be entitled to prevail; a lawyer, no more
than others, can escape liability for fraud by closing his eyes
to what he saw and could readily understand."
However, in the next sentence the court left open the question of
whether an attorney, without actual or implied knowledge, whose
activities are no more than those customary for outside counsel can
be held liable under Rule 10b-5:
31See, e.g., Nicewarner v. Bleavins, 244 F. Supp. 261 (D. Colo. 1965) (no liability
under § 12(1) where defendant did no more than serve as an attorney); Wonneman v.
Stratford Securities Co. [1957-61 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.SEC.L.REP. 91,034
(S.D.N.Y. 1961) (lawyer did only legal work and was a "stranger to the illegal sales").
Cf. SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1315 n. 24 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Koenig,
CCH FED.SEc.L.REP. 94,765 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
32388 F.2d 486 (3d Cir. 1968).
33M. at 489.
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Whether the fraud sections of the securities law go beyond this
and require a lawyer passing on an offering circular to run
down possible infirmities in his client's story of which he has
been put on notice, and if so, what efforts are required of him,
is a closer question on which it is important that the court be
seized of the precise facts, including the extent, as the SEC
claimed with respect to Frank, to which his role went beyond
a lawyer's normal one.
34
To date, no court has considered this question. Thus, except where
the attorney actively and knowingly assists in a fraudulent scheme
or is an insider of the company, the development of the law under the
federal securities statutes with respect to attorney's liabilities to third
parties has not departed in any material respect from that existing
under common law principles.
Two recent cases, however, suggest that courts may well hold a
negligent attorney liable in the future even in the absence of a special
relationship or his knowing and active participation. In SEC v. Spec-
trum Ltd.," the Second Circuit considered in the context of an in-
junctive suit the question left open in the Frank case and concluded
in a carefully limited opinion that an attorney may be liable as an
aider and abettor under Rule 10b-5 if he negligently fails to investi-
gate beyond routine inquiry the facts upon which his opinion is based
when that opinion results in an illegal securities distribution. In its
opinion, the court sets forth as the policy base for that strict standard
of culpability the ultimate public responsibility of the securities law-
yer:
The legal profession plays a unique and pivotal role in the
effective implementation of the securities laws. Questions of
compliance with the intricate provisions of these statutes are
ever present and the smooth functioning of the securities mar-
kets will be seriously disturbed if the public cannot rely on the
expertise proffered by an attorney when he renders an opinion
on such matters . ...
In the distribution of unregistered securities, the preparation
of an opinion letter is too essential and the reliance of the
public too high to permit due diligence to be cast aside in the
name of convenience. The public trust demands more of its
3[1972-73 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.SEC.L.REP. 93,631 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), rev'd,
489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973). See generally Comment, Securities Regulation, 87 HARv.
L. REV. 1860 (1974).
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legal advisers than 'customary' activities which prove to be
careless. And, to be sure, where expediency precludes thorough
investigation, an attorney can prevent the illicit use of his
opinion letter by prohibiting its utilization in the sale of unre-
gistered securities by a statement to that effect clearly appear-
ing on the face of the letter . . ..
Despite being limited to injunctive suits37 and being a case involving
"hard facts," this decision must realistically be viewed with sub-
stantial concern by the securities bar, as the policies resulting in the
application of a negligence standard in Spectrum arguably could be
used to support the imposition of civil damage liability to that inde-
terminate class of public investors whose reliance on counsel may be
"too high to permit due diligence to be cast aside.
'3 9
Similarly, in the case of Black & Co. v. Nova-Tech, Inc.,4 the
presumed reliance by the investing public upon the care of counsel
played an important role in the decision which held that for jurisdic-
tional purposes under state blue sky laws, counsel who prepared cer-
tain legal papers which were unknowingly used in an illegal securities
sale was a "participant" in the illegal sale.4 The district court also
'489 F.2d at 541-42.
3Trhe court specifically stated that its decision "should not be construed to apply
to more peripheral participants in an illegal scheme or, for that matter, to criminal
prosecution or private suits for damages." Id. at 542.
3wThe facts present so many red flags regarding the transaction to which the opin-
ion related that the healthy skepticism possessed by the careful securities lawyer would
clearly have demanded further investigation of the facts underlying the opinion, par-
ticularly where counsel was a stranger to his client. For an in-depth discussion of the
"unusual" circumstances existing at the time the opinion was rendered, see Slain,
Spectrum, 7 REV.OF SEc.REG. 927, 929-30 (1974). Given these unusual facts, the deci-
sion perhaps more properly could have fallen into the situation where as set forth in
the Frank case the lawyer cannot "escape liability for fraud by closing his eyes to what
he saw and could readily understand." Cf. SEC v. Universal Major Industries Corp.,
- F. Supp. -, (S.D.N.Y. 1975). SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. 95,017, at 97,569 (2d Cir. 1975).
310ne author suggests that the statutes provide no basis for a more strict standard
of culpability in suits for injunctive relief than in those for civil damages and suggests
that the negligence standard of culpability established by Spectrum may well raise the
specter of horrendous civil liability to third parties. See Slain, Spectrum, 7 REV.OF SEC.
REG. 927, 928 (1974). For an application of the negligence standard of Spectrum in a
context outside its facts, see Maryland Securities Act Release No. 16, 2 CCH BLUE SKY
Rpm. T 23,628 (Mar. 9, 1974). Cf. SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1315 n. 24, 1316 n. 30
(6th Cir. 1974).
40333 F. Supp. 468 (D. Ore. 1971).
"Applying a strict "but for" test, under the court's reasoning the attorney would
have been a "participant" even if he proved that his independent inquiry would not
1975]
610 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXII
held that his law partners were "participants" because the firm had
authorized the company to include its name as corporate counsel in
its annual reports which were used in connection with the unlawful
sales. Although the case did not relate to substantive liability and has
since been challenged by the Supreme Court of Oregon,42 the opinion
by its very existence causes serious concern as an extreme example
of the extent to which some courts may go in these uncharted waters.
It is important to remember that even if actions by large groups
of remote third parties are permitted under the federal securities
laws, liability will not attach unless the attorney fails to meet the
requisite standard of care. While it is clear under common law princi-
ples that the standard of care is determined by reference to the care
commonly exercised by others of the profession, it is uncertain
whether counsel's liability under the federal securities laws will be
similarly governed by the ordinary care of the profession. For exam-
ple, the recent Ninth Circuit decision of W4hite v. Abrams42 .' rejects
the traditional concepts of "negligence" or "scienter" as standards of
culpability and creates a new "flexible duty" test which requires an
ad hoc examination of all the facts and circumstances of the matter
in question. This approach leaves the securities lawyer in a quandry
with effectively no set standards and with hindsight judging whether
or not his conduct was equitable in the context of the particular
transaction being challenged. His quandry is further complicated by
the fact that, unlike the accountant,43 he does not have the aid and
have uncovered the illegality of the sale. Id. at 472.
12Recognizing the implications of the strict liability standard apparently underly-
ing the district court's opinion, the Oregon Supreme Court permitted lack of knowl-
edge to be raised by an attorney as a defense and characterized the Nova-Tech opinion
as being "over broad, if literally applied." Adams v. American Western Sec., Inc., 265
Ore. 514, 510 P.2d 838 (1973).
42.1495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974). This "flexible duty" standard considers such
factors as the relationship of the defendant to the plaintiff, their relative access to
information, the benefit denied by the defendant, the reliance of the defendant upon
the plaintiff and the knowledge of the plaintiff of such reliance. For a thorough discus-
sion of the flexible duty standard, see Note, The Development of a Flexible Duty
Standard Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 99 (1975). In using such an
ad hoc balancing test, the Ninth Circuit seems to have followed the pattern set by the
recent California common law malpractice decisions. See note 16 supra; Fiflis, Current
Problems of Accountants' Responsibilities to Third Parties, 28 VAND. L. Rzv. 31, 113-
28 (1975). For examples of the present confusion surrounding the degree of culpability
required to sustain 10b-5 liability, compare SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir.
1974), with SEC v. Dolnick, CCH FED.SEc.L.REP. 94,762 (7th Cir. 1974) and SEC v.
Spectrum, Ltd., [1972-73 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.SEC.L.REP. 93,631 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), rev'd, 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973).
"The conduct of accountants is generally governed by a set of auditing procedures
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comfort of formal professional standards designed to balance the con-
flicting responsibilities of the securities lawyer. Certainly as the ex-
tent of liability and unpredictability increases, the need for such
guidelines by which the attorney arguably is to be judged increases.
Moreover, such standards by considering and reflecting the public
obligations of the securities lawyer can aid in defining the extent of
those obligations. Surely, it is foolhardy to leave the development of
operable standards to custom and practice or to ad hoc judicial deter-
minations; the profession should provide a set of standards, particu-
larly with respect to the preparation of disclosure documents and
opinion letters related to securities matters.
2. SEC Complaints and Proceedings.
The SEC has sought to influence the creation of operable stan-
dards for securities lawyers through imaginative and aggressive liti-
gation based primarily on Rule 10b-541 and through its own adminis-
trative disciplinary proceedings under Rule 2(e) of its Rules of Prac-
tice.4" In recent administrative proceedings, the Commission has
begun to take a tougher line with respect to the negligent conduct of
counsel," and in so doing has emphasized that the securities lawyer
known as "generally accepted auditing standards" (GAAS). AMERiCAN INSTITUTE OF
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, STATEMENT ON AUDITING STANDARDS (1974). See
generally Strother, The Establishment of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
and Generally Accepted Auditing Standards, 28 VAND. L. REv. 201 (1975). While
compliance with GAAS has not in every case provided protection from liability under
Rule 10b-5, courts have always relied upon the standards in cases based upon common
law principles to determine whether the accountant was liable. Compare U.S. v.
Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969) with Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100
(7th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, - U.S. _ 43 U.S.L.W. 3550 (U.S. Apr. 14, 1975).
"See, e.g., SEC v. Canusa Holdings, Civ. Action No. 74-30, (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2,
1974); SEC v. Allegheny Beverage Corp., [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED.SEC.L.REs. 94,183, (D.D.C. May 11, 1973); SEC v. R. D. Philpot, Civ. Action
No. 73-543 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 1973); SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., [1971-
72 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.SEC.L.RE1. 93,360 (D.D.C., filed Feb. 3, 1972); SEC
v. Everest Management Corp., Civ. Action No. 71-4932 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 11, 1971); SEC
v. Universal Major Industries Corp., Civ. Action No. 73-3626 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
4s17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1974). Under this rule the Commission may "disqualify,
and deny temporarily or permanently, the privilege" of practicing before the Commis-
sion. For additional discussion of the disciplinary proceedings under this rule, see
Johnson, The Expanding Responsibility of Attorneys in Practice Before the SEC, 25
MERCER L. REv. 637(1974). See generally Sonde, Professional Disciplinary Proceedings,
National Institute, supra note 4, at 157-62.
"While the Commission has long taken the position that negligent conduct could
be the basis of a Rule 2(e) proceeding, almost all of its proceedings have involved
intentional and active participation in fraudulent schemes. Only recently has the
Commission actually proceeded against lesser unintentional conduct. Compare Mur-
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has a public duty to assist in the enforcement of securities laws,
which may override his duty to his client.17 For example, in the
Emanuel Fields proceeding," the Commission consciously set forth in
the following footnote its current view of counsel's public responsibili-
ties:
Members of this Commission have pointed out time and time
again that the task of enforcing the securities laws rests in
overwhelming measure on the bar's shoulders. These were
statements of what all who are versed in the practicalities of
securities law know to be a truism, i.e., that this Commission
with its small staff, limited resources, and onerous tasks is
peculiarly dependent on the probity and diligence of the pro-
fessionals that practice before it . . . .This is a field where
unscrupulous lawyers can inflict irreparable harm on those
who rely on the disclosure documents that they produce.
Hence, we are under a duty to hold our bar to appropriately
rigorous standards of professional honor . . ..
Moreover, the Commission specifically rejected the suggestion that
the standards of conduct set by state courts were controlling in its
administrative proceedings. It indicated that a higher level of con-
duct may be required by "the peculiarly strategic and especially cen-
tral place of the private practicing lawyer in the investment process
and in the enforcement of the body of federal law aimed at keeping
the process fair."5
ray A. Kivitiz, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5163 (June 29, 1971), rev'd, 475 F.2d
956 (D.D.C. 1973) with Albert D. Fleischmann, 37 S.E.C. 832 (1950). Moreover, the
number of proceedings against attorneys has increased dramatically since 1970. See
Johnson, The Expanding Responsibility of Attorneys in Practice Before the SEC, 25
MERCER L. REv. 637, 644 (1974).
"Historically, the Commission sanctioned the view that the attorney's primary
duty was to his client, not to the investing public. In American Finance Company, 40
S.E.C. 1043 (1962), the Commission set forth this position as follows:
Though owing a public responsibility, an attorney in acting as the
client's advisor, defender, advocate and confidant enters into a per-
sonal relationship in which his principal concern is with the interests
and rights of his client. The requirement of the act of certification by
an independent accountant, on the other hand, is intended to secure
for the benefit of public investors the detached objectivity of a disin-
terested person.
See also SEC Accounting Release No. 126, CCH FED.SEc.L.REP. 72,148, at 62,351
(July 5, 1972).
"SEC Securities Act Release No. 5404 (June 18, 1973).
"Id. at 5.
1Id. It should be noted that Fields who admitted repeated violations of the securi-
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In addition to such statements, whch are echoed in recent public
speeches by Chairman Garrett and Commissioner Sommer, the
Commission recently has begun to use consent sanctions to set forth
desired levels of conduct for the securities lawyer irrespective of what
standards may be judicially or ethically established.,' Until 1974, all
proceedings imposing remedial sanctions on a professional involved
the accounting profession; and given the tendency of the Commission
to relate the functions and duties of the attorney in the scheme of
securities regulation to those of the independent public auditor,52
these matters become important background material to an under-
standing of the significance of the recent consent sanctions including
attorneys.
The Commission generally has looked to and relied upon the ac-
counting profession to develop and maintain high quality professional
auditing standards. 3 In recent years, however, the Commission has
on occasion demonstrated its impatience with their professional self-
regulation in certain areas 4 and has increasingly negotiated remedial
consent sanctions55 designed to extract a desired level of care from the
ties laws did not challenge any factual allegations but chose to fight the Commission's
legal power to bar him from SEC practice. In light of the unquestioned misconduct of
Fields, the statements quoted in the text apparently were consciously aimed at the bar
as a whole.
5 1In re McLaughlin & Stem, Ballen and Miller, SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 11516 (July 8, 1975); In re Jo M. Ferguson, SEC Securities Act Release
No. 5523 (Aug. 21, 1974). See also SEC v. Allegheny Beverage Corporation, Civ. Action
No. 932-73 (D.D.C. July 8, 1975) (Stipulation and Undertaking of the law firm defen-
dant Wright, Robertson & Dowell, and C. Gordon Haines, a partner).
'2See, e.g., Sommer, The Emerging Responsibilities of the Securities Lawyer,
[1973-74 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.SEc.L.REP. 79,631, at 83,689 (1974).
5'This policy decision was expressed as early as 1940 in McKesson & Robbins, Inc.,
SEC Accounting Release No. 19, (1940), as follows:
We have carefully considered the desirability of specific rules and
regulations governing the auditing steps to be performed by accoun-
tants in certifying financial statements to be filed with us. Action has
already been taken by the accounting profession. . . . Until experi-
ence should prove to the contrary, we feel this program is prefer-
able. ...
See also SEC Accounting Series Release No. 150 (Dec. 20, 1973).
"The most publicized example of the Commission's action in absence of the action
by the profession relates to the use of treasury stock in acquisitions to be accounted
for on a "pooling-of-interest" accounting method. See SEC Securities Act Release No.
33-5416A (Apr. 11, 1974). See also SEC Accounting Series Release No. 151 (Jan. 3,
1974) (disclosure of inventory profits due to inflating).
-All remedial sanctions have to date been imposed by consent. For a critique of
the Commission's use of consent decrees and other enforcement techniques, see Tread-
way, SEC Enforcement Techniques: Expanding and Exotic Forms of Ancillary Relief,
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professior A6 Generally, these sanctions have been a mixture of "due
care" and quality control guidelines, including programs of peer re-
view of auditing procedures with reports to the Commission, the
adoption of new auditing procedures, restrictions on accepting new
engagements and on merging with other firms, and in some cases a
minimum number of hours of continuing professional education. In
one of the most significant of these cases, In the Matter of Touche
Ross & Co.,57 the Commission commented with respect to these sanc-
tions as follows:
In accepting Touche's undertaking to adopt certain procedures
to strengthen its existing ones, the Commission does not con-
template that they will encompass steps which are other than
required by generally accepted auditing standards. Rather,
Touche and the Commission contemplate these procedures
will improve Touche's ability to carry out its responsibility to
exercise due professional care in the conduct of its future en-
gagements. While we do not believe that any form of procedure
can ever be a substitute for the kind of healthy skepticisms
which a good audit requires, we anticipate that these proce-
dures will materially aid in the performance of the firm's re-
sponsibility.
Consistent with that statement, the remedial sanctions imposed in
the accounting proceedings have generally operated within the frame-
work of the standards set forth by the profession itself.
In August 1974 the Commission for the first time applied the
technique of remedial consent sanctions in a Rule 2(e) proceeding
involving an attorney. Jo M. Ferguson was bond counsel in connec-
32 WASH.&LEE L. REV. - (1975). The question as to whether a court may require
by order a peer investigation and remedial procedures is being litigated. SEC v. Goetek
Resources Fund, Inc. Docket No. 73 Civ. 0819 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 1973); SEC v. Talley
Indus., Inc. [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.SEc.L.REP. 94,198, (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
1973). The question as to whether the SEC may order such sanctions has not been
raised to date in a Rule 2(e) proceeding. Cf. Heater v. F.T.C., 503 F.2d 321 (9th Cir.
1974). See generally Burton, SEC Enforcement and Professional Accountants, 28
VAND. L. REv. 19 (1975).
51See, e.g., In re Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., SEC Accounting Series Release
No. 173 (July 2, 1975); In re Benjamin Botwinick & Co., SEC Accounting Series
Release No. 168 (Jan. 13, 1975); In re Westheimer, Fine, Berger & Co., SEC Accounting
Series Release No. 167 (Dec. 24, 1974); In re Arthur Andersen & Co., SEC Accounting
Series Release No. 157 (July 8, 1974); In re Touche Ross & Co., SEC Accounting Series
Release No. 153 (Feb. 25, 1974); In re Leventhal, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, SEC
Accounting Series Release No. 144 (May 23, 1973).
51SEC Accounting Series Release No. 153 (Feb. 25, 1974).
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tion with an offering of revenue bonds issued in 1972 to finance the
construction of a nursing home. The prospectus for the issue con-
tained certain omissions of material facts and Ferguson had the prin-
cipal legal responsibility for reviewing that document for its com-
pleteness and accuracy.58 The consent order provided that Ferguson
should have known of the omissions:
Because of his review of the prospectus, his pre-existing rela-
tionship with the developer on other offerings of municipal
bonds, and other factors which had come to his attention, res-
pondent [Ferguson] should have known, if he did not know,
that the prospectus omitted material facts.
Ferguson was censored, not suspended, in part based upon the volun-
tary adoption by him and his law firm of "corrective changes in the
firm's procedures relative to municipal bonds." Among the agreed
upon changes in future firm activities are the following:
1. Every two weeks members of the firm must meet and
discuss all of their active cases. Affirmative approval of each
partner is required before the issuance of any legal opinion.
2. The firm must undertake an appropriate investigation
in connection with acting as bond counsel including, among
other things, obtaining independently-audited financial state-
ments and inquiring into the background of the various parties
connected with the offering. Written evidence of such investi-
gations and the results thereof will be reviewed by the partners
of the firm.
3. An appropriate "engagement letter" will be sent to all
interested parties, emphasizing that the firm's duty is to the
issuer and the bondholders. It will define the scope of the firm's
work as bond counsel and require submission to the firm of
certain pertinent information.
4. The firm will require that it receive independently-
audited financial statements, representations from appropri-
"Recently, the Commission won its action for a civil injunction against other
participants in the offering with the court specifically finding material omissions in the
prospectus. As is clear from this decision, Ferguson did not draft the prospectus, but
only reviewed it after it had been written by one of the defendants enjoined in this
decision. SEC v. The Senex Corp., CCH FED.SEC.L.REP. 95,001 (E.D. Ky. 1975).
Query whether Ferguson would have had due diligence obligations or 10b-5 exposure
if in his review he found the document to be completely consistent within his knowl-
edge of the facts, or if he had limited his duties to passing on the legality of the bonds
only and disclosed the limited scope of his duties.
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ately interested persons concerning the accuracy and com-
pleteness of the statements about them in any offering circu-
lars and a statement from counsel for any lessee or guarantor
that such counsel has reviewed the offering circular and is
aware of no inaccuracies therein.
5. Partners and associates of the firm will attend, at least
annually, municipal bond workshops and seminars."9
Some of these procedures relate to particular quality control prob-
lems of the Ferguson firm, but others relate to general legal "audit-
ing" procedures which the Commission appears to consider an inte-
gral part of the professional due care of the municipal bond lawyer.
The remedial sanctions agreed to recently by the law firms who
were named defendants in the Commission's 1973 action against Alle-
gheny Beverage Corporation are important indicators of the direction
in which the Commission appears to be headed. The defendants, who
acted strictly in a representative capacity as outside counsel for the
issuer and for the underwriter in connection with a registered public
offering, allegedly failed to detect the sham nature of certain transac-
tions at the closing of the offering. Counsel for the underwriter agreed
to an order pursuant to Rule 2(e) which censured the firm for the
inadequate supervision of its associate who attended the closing and
who failed at the closing to conduct "a more detailed inquiry" which
would have disclosed the sham nature of the closing. The Rule 2(e)
order requires, among other things, the firm's adoption of certain
internal supervisory procedures "designed to strengthen its existing
procedures in connection with securities matters handled by the
firm." 59' In a stipulation and undertaking filed in federal court as
part of a final order of dismissal, counsel for the issuer also agreed to
the adoption of such supervisory procedures, and in addition agreed
that it would not accept any new clients involving practice before the
Commission during the 60-day period in which such procedures were
"It is interesting to note that the Supreme Courts of Iowa, Minnesota and Wash-
ington are in the final stages of adopting unprecedented rules which will require mem-
bers of their respective bars to complete a certain number of hours of continuing legal
education each year.
".'In re McLaughlin & Stem, Ballen and Miller, SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 11516 (July 8, 1975). The procedures to be adopted specifically require that
a partner experienced in the federal securities laws attend all securities closings, ap-
prove all securities opinion letters, and review and adequately supervise all associates'
work involving the federal securities laws. In addition, the firm must review its proce-
dures used in connection with its representation of issuers and underwriters in public
offerings of securities and implement such further procedures as it deems appropriate.
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being adopted and implemented. 9 '-2 Neither consent order, however,
requires a peer examination of present procedures or a peer or Com-
mission review of those procedures ultimately adopted and imple-
mented, as have often been required in similar settlements involving
accounting firms.
The use of remedial measures as a settlement technique is likely
to be continued in future settlements of legal as well as administra-
tive proceedings," and thereby may ultimately affect the standard of
care which may be applied by the courts in securities actions by civil
litigants for private damages. Unlike the accounting profession, the
legal profession has precious few written procedures within which the
Commission can frame remedial consent sanctions. This absence of
written procedures eases the way for the Commission to develop mini-
mal levels of conduct on an ad hoc basis, and its recent activity in
this area clearly increases the need for the profession to act quickly
and responsibly to fill the void existing with respect to the appropri-
ate level of due care required in securities matters.
III. DEVELOPING APPROPRIATE STANDARDS OF
CONDUCT
The foregoing analysis of the present conditions under which the
securities lawyer practices demonstrates the following:
1. The Commission is most serious when it states that
attorneys involved in securities transactions must act as
guardians of the interests of the investing public, and intends
to effect that policy through judicial and administrative pro-
ceedings.
2. The nature and extent of the responsibilities of the se-
curities lawyer to the public, and any civil liabilities which
5' SEC v. Allegheny Beverage Corp., Civ. Action No. 932-73 (D.D.C. July 8, 1975)
(Stipulation and Undertaking of the law firm defendant Wright, Robertson & Dowell,
and of C. Gordon Haines, a partner).
"Since the Ferguson order was released, an Associate Director of the Division of
Enforcement of the Commission has publicly emphasized that the procedures adopted
by the Ferguson firm were done voluntarily prior to the Commission's proceeding and
would have little value as precedential guidelines which establish due care. Such
guidelines will flow on a case-by-case basis although no one should look to the Commis-
sion to establish an ethical code of conduct. Remarks of Wallace Timmeny, SEC
Speaks - 1975 (Practicing Law Institute, March 1, 1975); Remarks of Wallace Tim-
meny, Municipal Bonds Workshop - 11th (Practicing Law Institute, February 19,
1975). Cf. Burton, SEC Enforcement and Professional Accountants, 28 VAND. L. REV.
19, 24-26 (1975).
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may flow therefrom, are in an embryonic stage of development
and their boundaries are by no means fixed or immutable.
3. The courts have given remarkably little consideration
to the requisite level of care and have generally looked to ex-
pert testimony to establish on an ad hoc basis whether chal-
lenged conduct departs from the due care commonly exercised
by other members of the legal profession, although recent dis-
cussions under the federal securities law indicate that courts
may well apply to the securities lawyer a higher standard of
care than that set forth as the norm by expert testimony.
The message should be crystal clear; the profession should act now
to formulate balanced and functional standards to guide professional
conduct in this area - much as the accounting profession has done
for years in its statements on auditing standards.
There are two principal objections which may be raised against
this approach. First, some would argue that standards should develop
on a case-by-case basis, thereby permitting the judicial system to
respond to the changing needs and demands of society. They argue
further that any set of guidelines would be horribly complex traps for
the unwary, creating prima facie cases of professional negligence for
any departures therefrom." With respect to the first part of that
objection, the formulation of guidelines in this area surely would not
impede the ability of the judicial system to stay in step with society
any more than does judicial precedent or existing professional stan-
dards. Unquestionably, for the guidelines to be workable they must
continually reflect and react to the expectations of society by balanc-
ing critical interests in an independent and objective fashion. Cer-
tainly, as vividly evidenced by several recent accounting cases,6 2 if the
standards set by the profession fail in this regard, the courts will not
hesitate in requiring higher standards. On the other hand, if the
standards do reflect the interests of society, the courts are likely to
respect them as creating a presumption of requisite due care. The
second part- of this objection assumes the formulation of a highly
detailed set of rules, which is neither desirable nor expected. Stan-
dards should be flexible guides with sufficient content to be meaning-
ful in specific situations but with enough room to permit the exercise
of responsible judgment in handling the many close questions pre-
61See, e.g., Sommer, Professional Responsibility: How Did We Get Here?, Na-
tional Institute, supra note 4, at 95-103.
"See U.S. v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969); Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein,
Horwath & Horwath, CCH FED.SEc.L.REP. 94,574 (S.D.NY. 1974).
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sented by our complex society. So formulated, the standards will aid,
not trap, the bar. Moreover, any departues therefrom should not
automatically create liability but should simply shift the burden to
the attorney to prove that such departures are justified urider the
particular circumstances.
The second objection to the formulation of standards relating to
securities work flows from the proposition that any lawyer, including
the securities lawyer, is responsible only to his client and to no one
else. Proponents of this view argue that the formulation of standards
reflecting public responsibilities would dilute the absolute duty owed
to the client, and would seriously erode the attorney-client privilege,
all in contradiction to their reading of the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility. 3 It is of course clear that under the Code a lawyer is
bound to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law,
which requires him to render his professional judgment within those
bounds solely for the benefit of his client and free of compromising
influences and loyalties." Yet, it is equally clear - and even recog-
nized by existing professional standards"5 - that public responsibili-
ties do exist and may require independent conduct within the para-
meters of that Canon. This is particularly true where the lawyer acts
in the private legal process as an adviser, rather than in the public
65The most outspoken proponent of this view is Dean Monroe H. Freedman who
categorically rejects the concept of the attorney aiding the Commission as a policeman
of the securities laws. He further refuses to recognize any distinction in the roles of the
office lawyer and the trial lawyer. See, e.g., Freedman, A Civil Libertarian Looks at
Securities Regulation, 35 OHIo ST. L.J. 280 (1974).
"ABA ConE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSMILMY, Canon 7 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
ABA CODE]. However, the absolute duty thereunder is qualified by applicable Disci-
plinary Rules which state that an attorney cannot assist his client in illegal or fraudu-
lent conduct and requires withdrawal rather than further assistance of such conduct.
ABA CODE, DR 7-102. In applying this Disciplinary Rule to securities matters, consid-
erable controversy has developed, particularly over the meaning of DR 7-102(B)(1)
which requires the lawyer to report fraud to the affected person or tribunal when a
client refuses to stop or rectify the fraud, "except where the information is protected
as a privileged communication." See generally Responsibility of Lawyers Advising
Management, National Institute, supra note 4, at 13-29; Bialkin, The Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility and the Responsibility of Lawyers Engaged in Securities Law
Practice, 30 Bus. Law. 1289 (1975).
51rhe Ethical Considerations, Disciplinary Rules, and Formal Opinions issued
under Canon 7 reflect to varying degrees the interests of the public. See, e.g., ABA
CODE, EC 7-3, EC 7-5, EC 7-15, DR 7-102, Formal Opinion No. 335. Additionally, as
the Canon itself reflects, the lawyer is not the alter ego of his client's desires, but is
limited by the "bounds of the law" which most certainly reflect public interests,
particularly where the law is designed to protect the public from fraud in securities
transactions.
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process as an advocate. The late esteemed Professor Cheatham and
Dean Patterson in their book The Profession of Law succinctly sum-
marize the distinct difference in the standards applicable to these
roles as follows: 6
The roles of the lawyer in these processes differ
widely. . . . These roles, their settings, and the responsibili-
ties they entail vary. Standards grow out of responsibilities,
and they too, must vary, for the standards of the lawyer are,
and must be, functional ...
Trial standards are designed for adversary proceedings, and
they relate primarily to the conduct of the lawyer, not to the
conduct of the client. The trial is concerned only with a deter-
mination of the consequences of the client's past actions, and
the lawyer is not free to sit in judgment on those actions ...
In the unstructured setting of the private legal and admin-
istrative processes, the conduct of the client is relevant to the
lawyer's standards, for the lawyer outside the trial most often
looks to the future, not the past. He is not only free to judge
his client's proposed actions, it is part of his job to do so ...
This difference has not ordinarily received from the organ-
ized bar the consideration in difference of standards which its
fundamental importance calls for ....
To suggest that all standards should focus only on the lawyer's duties
to his client to the exclusion of others is to ignore these materially
different roles and to overlook the larger concepts and goals of our
legal system. The bar cannot afford to ignore its existing duties to the
public in today's society which does in fact demand in certain situa-
tions the independent conduct of the securities lawyer.
In summary, there are substantial and conflicting responsibilities
for the securities lawyer acting in the private legal process which raise
difficult questions as to what he should and should not do. Affirma-
16R. PATTERSON & E. CHEATHAM, THE PROFESSION OF LAW 62, 70, 47 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as R. PATTERSON & E. CHEATHAM]. The legal adviser does not stand
in the position of trying to get whatever he can in any way he can for his client, for it
is clear that the "reasons that justify and even require partisan advocacy in the trial
of a cause do n4ot grant any license to the lawyer to participate as legal adviser in a
lihe of conduct that is immoral, unfair, or of doubtful validity." Professional Responsi-
bility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159 (1958). The Code in a limited
fashion does recognize this vital distinction. See, e.g., ABA CODE, EC 7-3.
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tive standards are surely desirable to aid him and the courts in an-
swering these questions. The need for such standards is succinctly
stated by Professor Cheatham and Dean Patterson:67
These loyalties, as do the basic policies underlying our legal
system, all conflict in some measure. The lawyer needs affirm-
ative guides in the form of standards to aid him in resolving
these conflicts. The stated standards create for him a level of
expectations, a matter of fundamental importance, for law-
yers, as do all men, tend to act as others expect them to act.
Simply stated, a lawyer's standards are an integral part of the law
itself and reflect expected levels of conduct, and where there are no
defined levels of expectation the very order and stability of our legal
system is endangered. The need for such standards relating to certain
difficult areas of securities law is therefore clear and must be met.
A. The Organized Bar and the Formulation of Guidelines
The bar has not totally ignored the problems of formulating ap-
propriate guidelines in this area, but to date it has been slow and
limited in its reactions. The most recent professional standards of the
organized bar are set forth in the Code of Professional Responsibility
of 1969.68 The Code contains nine Canons, each of which is accompa-
nied by a number of "Ethical Considerations" and "Disciplinary
Rules." The former represent objectives toward which each member
of the profession should strive, while Disciplinary Rules are manda-
tory and state minimal levels of permissible conduct.69 Supplement-
ing these are formal opinions issued by the ABA's Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility to interpret the principles in
difficult practical problem areas. Unfortunately, most of the Code
and the principles and opinions relating thereto have historically
concentrated on the problems of the courtroom lawyer as an advocate
in the public judicial process and little attention has been given the
lawyer whose responsibilities and problems arise from his role in the
private legal and administrative processes."
17R. PATTERSON AND E. CHEATHAM, supra note 66, at 62.
"Other statements of standards by the ABA are the CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL
ETHics OF 1908 and PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: A STATEMENT OF 1958. Of the three
statements only the one issued in 1958 attempts to handle in detail the problems of
the office lawyer in the private legal process. For a complete analysis of these standards
and their applicability to the profession, see R. PATTERSON & E. CHEATHAM, suljra note
66.
"ABA CODE, "Preliminary Statement."
70R. PATrERSON & E. CHEATHAM, supra note 66, at 68-72.
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Nevertheless, there are positive signs of an increasing awareness
of the need to provide standards for the office lawyer, including the
securities lawyer. On February 2, 1974, the Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility issued Formal Opinion No. 335 which is
the first formal statement by the organized bar giving consideration
to the unique responsibilities and roles played by attorneys rendering
opinions relating to transactions involving sales of unregistered secur-
ities. " The Opinion is explicitly and carefully limited in three re-
spects:
1. It relates only to transactions involving sales of unregis-
tered securities.
2. It is designed to provide guidelines, not standards for de-
termining negligent conduct, which is deemed to be an issue
"for the trier of fact under a particular set of facts."7
3. It is based upon Ethical Considerations and goes further
than the mandatory duties set forth in applicable Disciplinary
Rules .73
Within these limitations, the Opinion discusses the professional
standards of inquiry and verification which should be followed in
preparing opinions relating to sales of unregistered securities and is
presented as a direct reaction to the following statement by the Com-
mission:
7
"If an attorney furnishes an opinion based solely on hypotheti-
cal facts which he has made no effort to verify, and if he knows
his opinion will be relied upon as the basis for a substantial
7'ABA COMM. ON ETmIcS AND PROF. RESPONSIBILITY, OPINIONS, No. 335 (1974) re-
printed in 60 A.B.A.J. 488 (1974). For more detailed guidelines which are applicable
to the preparation of all types of opinion letters, see Freeman, Opinion Letters and
Professionalism, 1973 DuKE L.J. 371, 433-39.
7 This limitation is consistent with the Preliminary Statement to the Code itself
which states that the Code does not "undertake to define standards for civil liability
of lawyers for professional conduct." Yet, hopefully, unless the guidelines are not
functionally realistic, compliance with such standards should create a rebuttable pre-
sumption to be used by the trier of fact to test the conduct of the attorney in the
particular set of facts before him.
71Specifically, the Opinion is based upon EC 6-1, EC 6-4, EC 6-5, EC 7-5, EC 7-6,
EC 7-8, EC 5-1 and EC 1-5 of the ABA Code. The Opinion also cites the following
Disciplinary Rules as applicable to this situation: DR 7-102(A) (5) (knowledge of falsity
of opinion); DR 7-102(A)(7) (knowledge of client's illegal or fraudulent conduct); and
DR 6-101(A)(2) or (3) (conscious disregard of duties to client).
7SEC Securities Act Release No. 4445 (Feb. 2, 1962). See also SEC Securities Act
Release No. 5168 (July 7, 1971).
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distribution of unregistered securities, a serious question arises
as to the propriety of his professional conduct."
In responding to that question, the Committee emphasizes that coun-
sel's responsibility is to render to the client his considered,
independent opinion and clearly recognizes that "while the responsi-
bility that a lawyer has is to his client, he must not be oblivious of
the extent to which others may be affected if he is derelict in fulfilling
that responsibility." That general proposition underlies each of the
following guidelines set forth in the Opinion:
1. The lawyer must consider what facts are relevant to the
giving of the requested opinion and must make a reasonable
inquiry from his client to obtain such facts as are not within
his personal knowledge.
2. He must test answers he receives from his client by review-
ing such appropriate documents as are available.
3. The lawyer cannot always assume and rely upon the repre-
sentations of his client and must make further inquiry (or inde-
pendent investigation) where (a) the facts presented are in-
complete in a material respect, or (b) the facts presented are
suspect or open to question, or (c) the facts presented are in-
consistent.7 5
4. The degree of further inquiry (or independent investiga-
tion) varies with the circumstances which include the lawyer's
knowledge of the reputation and attitude of his client and the
general trading conditions of the security involved.
5. If further inquiry (or independent investigation) is re-




The Opinion is silent with respect to any obligation which might
arise in the circumstances of an unsatisfactory further inquiry; i.e.,
whether the lawyer must resign or disclose to the Commission such
facts as he might discover which render the expressing of his opinion
impossible.77 It is unfortunate that the Opinion fails to treat that
75nn the absence of such suspicious circumstances, the lawyer may assume the
accuracy of the facts presented to him and no "audit" of his client's affairs is required.
71n such circumstances, an unverified opinion using limiting phrases such as
"based upon the facts as you have given them to me" or "apart from what you have
told me, ] have not inquired as to the facts," should not be rendered.
77For an analysis of the applicability of Disciplinary Rule 7-102 to this question,
see Lipman, The SEC's Reluctant Police Force: A New Role for Lawyers, 49 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 437, 454-62 (1974).
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thorny problem or the questions surrounding other types of opinions
relating to securities matters. It is also regretable that the guidelines
could not have been stated in a more binding fashion,78 for if the bar
is to lead the way in setting levels of conduct in such matters, it
should act positively and forcefully so that everyone, including the
Commission or any court, is absolutely clear as to the expected level
of conduct.79 Yet irrespective of their non-mandatory nature, the
guidelines represent a balanced and reasonable approach and, as
such, may be relied upon by a court in determining proper conduct
in rendering opinions. Thus, a lawyer who renders an opinion without
adequate factual inquiry and investigation where circumstances are
such as to raise suspicions similar to those in the Spectrum case 
7 -
1
will incur serious risk of liability if the opinion proves erroneous. But
where no reasonable cause exists to doubt facts which later prove
erroneous, it is doubtful that a court would or should impose liability
upon the attorney.
In addition to the Committee on Ethics and Professional Respon-
sibility, other bar groups are specifically studying the feasibility of
setting forth guidelines in difficult problem areas." For example, on
7sAlternatively, the opinion could have been based upon existing Disciplinary
Rules, or a new Disciplinary Rule relating to such opinions could have been fashioned
with the formal opinion then being based upon that rule. One method of handling
unique problems which may result in a departure from such mandatory guidelines is
to permit departures but only if the attorney can demonstrate unusual circumstances
which justify the departure. Cf. AICPA RESTATEMENT OF THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
ETmcs, Rule 203 (1972).
7 It of course is clear from the Preliminary Statement to the Code itself and from
recent accounting cases that such professional standards will not necessarily be bind-
ing upon the courts or the Commission. See Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath
& Horwath, CCH FED.SEc.L.REP. 94,574 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); U.S. v. Simon, 425 F.2d
796 (2d Cir. 1969). Yet in.substantially all cases it is submitted that such standards
would be adopted by the courts. Cf. Dorfv. Relles, 355 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1966); Escott
v. BarChris Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) ("accountants
should not be held to a standard higher than that recognized in their profession"). See
generally Earle, The Fairness Myth, 28 VAND. L. REv. 147 (1975); Hawes, Truth in
Financial Statements, 28 VAND. L. REv. 1 (1975).
79"-SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973). See notes 35-39 and accom-
panying text supra. See also note 76 and accompanying text supra.
"Both the ABA Section on Corporation, Banking and Business Law and the Asso-
ciation of the Bar of the City of New York have specially designated committees on
the responsibilities and liabilities of counsel. To date, neither has made any public
statements setting forth suggested guidelines, although the ABA Committee has re-
cently prepared an article dealing with the ABA Code and the duty of lawyers with
special reference to the securities laws. Bialkin, The Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity and the Responsibility of Lawyers Engaged in Securities Law Practice, 30 Bus.
Law. 1289 (1975). In areas other than securities law, imaginative responses to difficult
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October 20, 1974, the ABA Section on Corporation, Banking and
Business Law circulated for comment a revised exposure draft of
proposed guidelines designed to resolve the problem of lawyers re-
sponding to auditors' requests for information.8' Framed ultimately
to be "the policy of the American Bar Association," the proposed
guidelines seek to "provide greater precision to the responsibilities of
the bar in an area characterized by vagueness," while at the same
time resolving the conflicts between the two polarized viewpoints of
the accounting and the legal professions with respect to the former's
full disclosure obligations and the latter's confidential attorney-client
relationships. In balancing these conflicting responsibilities, the pro-
posed guidelines introduce the concept of "obligatory public disclo-
sure" which explicitly evidences an overriding concern with the pub-
lic interest where a client has publicly traded securities outstanding.2
If a client fails to make obligatory public disclosure when advised by
his attorney that such disclosure is obligatory, then the attorney
should disclose in his response to an auditor's request for information
the contingent liability which the failure to disclose raises. While the
proposed guidelines are not directly tied to the Code of Professional
Responsibility or their underlying principles, they do represent one
type of creative approach which could be utilized by the bar to guide
conduct in the securities area.
These initial efforts by the organized bar demonstrate an ability
to balance competing interests and responsibilities in a functional
manner and should be continued in order to provide guidance in those
cases where the expected levels of care remain muddled and unde-
fined. While the formulation of a code of professional standards de-
signed to cover all aspects of a securities practice is probably impract-
ical as well as undesirable,83 certain areas of that practice need atten-
tion and are ripe for the formulation of general guidelines. These
problems are being fashioned by state bar associations in the form of guidelines to
Disciplinary Rules. See, e.g., Carpenter, The Negligent Attorney Embezzler: Dela-
ware's Solution, 61 A.B.A.J. 338 (1975)_
8130 Bus. LAW. 513 (1975). See also Deer, Lawyers' Responses to Auditors' Re-
quests for Information, 28 Bus.LAw. 947 (1973); McRae, Representation Letters from
a Company's Legal Counsel, 136 J. OF ACCOUNTANCY, Nov. 1973, at 76.
82"Obligatory public disclosure" is defined to exist "where the matter is of such
importance and seriousness, and there could be no reasonable doubt that its nondisclo-
sure would give rise to material claims, but rejection by the client of the advice would
in all probability require the lawyer's withdrawal from employment in accordance with
the Code of Professional Responsibility." 30 Bus.LAw. 513, 526 (1975).
D'There is nevertheless recent precedent which supports the establishment of stan-
dards specially designed to cover all aspects of a specific role of a lawyer. See ABA
STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1971).
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areas, which are the ones most exposed to possible third party ac-
tions, are the issuing of opinion letters and the drafting of disclosure
documents required by the federal securities laws. While Opinion No.
335 sets forth guidelines for rendering opinions relating to the sales
of unregistered securities, no such guidelines exist as to opinions on
such matters as municipal bonds, merger or acquisition situations
involving securities and public offerings of securities. s4 Complex ques-
tions of policy and conflicting duties exist with respect to the stan-
dards to be followed in rendering these opinions, and affirmative
guidance is particularly needed in the following areas:
1. The Proper Scope and Uses of an Opinion - While the extent of
an opinion and any limitations on its use are clearly matters subject
to variation through negotiation, a guideline should emphasize the
need to define precisely and to set forth in the opinion the scope and
the limitations agreed upon by the parties and should further deal
with the tough policy question of whether circumstances may exist
which would render stated limitations on use nugatory.
2. The Need for Documentation - While the requirement of spe-
cific checklists should probably be avoided and left to the develop-
ment of individual firms or practitioners, a guideline should generally
require the use of work sheets and other types of memoranda to
substantiate the investigation required to render the particular opin-
ion.
3. The Need for Inquiry (or Independent Investigation) - A guide-
line would not be able to cover specifically all situations which raise
a duty of inquiry or of independent investigation, but should set
forth, much as in Opinion No. 335, the general circumstances which
require affirmative independent investigation. Many factors such as
past relationships between counsel and client, past financial and
business history, the nature of public reports and the nature of the
transaction involved will be determinative of the extent of inquiry or
"This discussion concerns only formal written opinions, and is not directed to-
wards oral opinions or informal written advice. Among the various formal opinions
covered are those required to be filed as exhibits to registration statements relating to
the legality of the issue, material litigation, taxes, or title to property; those rendered
to underwriters pursuant to an Underwriting Agreement; and those relating to tender
offers. For some suggested guidelines in these and other areas unrelated to securities
matters, see Freeman, Opinion Letters and Professionalism, 1973 DUKE L.J. 371, 434-
39; ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETmcs OPINIONs, No. 314, 51 A.B.A.J. 671 (1965) (tax
opinions); Sellin, Professional Responsibility of the Tax Practitioner, 52 TAXES 584
(1974).
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investigation, and thus, in that.limited sense, a guideline will be
unlikely to improve the "flexible duty" approach of White v.
Abrams."
4. The Use of Assumptions - Some circumstances will necessitate
the use of assumptions; however, it is doubtful whether one can
blindly assume key facts so that the opinion becomes a meaningless
restatement of the issues to be answered. Moreover, the permissible
use of assumptions will often be directly dependent upon the exist-
ence or non-existence of a duty of inquiry or independent investiga-
tion.
5. The Reliance Upon Opinions of Other Firms and Certificates of
Others - Any guidelines which relate to reliance upon officers' certif-
icates should be intimately tied to the factors determining the appro-
priate level of inquiry or independent investigation. Reliance upon
local or special counsel is entirely proper under most circumstances
and may even be required under some circumstances, but counsel
should not always be able to insulate himself from liability by such
reliance, particularly if the matter opined upon is in fact outside the
competence of counsel being relied upon.
6. The Use of Disclaimers and Qualifications - A guideline can be
fairly specific as to circumstances under which an opinion must be
qualified or not rendered. Although normally set forth with the state-
ment of opinion, disclaimers are more accurately a method of defin-
ing the scope of an opinion and should be so used. A lawyer, of course,
may not limit his liability for malpractice under the present Canons.8
7. The Effect of Subsequent Events and the Duty to Correct - This
problem may arise as a result of an opinion which is subsequently
discovered to be erroneous, in which case there should be a duty to
correct, or as a result of subsequent events which make the opinion
erroneous, in which case there may be a duty to correct even if the
opinion is accurate as of its date and disclaims any responsibility as
to subsequent events. 7
8. The Degree of "Independence" Required - Opinion No. 335 re-
quires an opinion on the sale of unregistered securities to be an "inde-
pendent" one, and it is likely that all opinions relating to securities
-495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
"ABA CODE, Canon 6, EC 6-6, DR 6-102(A).
"Cf. SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc. 458 F.2d 1082, 1096-97 (2d Cir. 1972);
Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); AICPA, STATEMENT ON AUDITING
STANDARDS No. 1, § 561 (1974).
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matters should also be. Yet nowhere is the concept of "independence"
explained. Guidance is needed, particularly with respect to the effect
of stock ownership or corporate directorships on the "independence"
of the opinion.8
9. The Requirement of Professional Competence - Canon 6 states
that a lawyer should represent his client competently, which properly
interpreted may require association of experienced securities coun-
sel. 9 A common situation in which this problem may exist is the
syndication of limited partnership interests in real estate, where a
real estate lawyer may overlook or misunderstand the application of
the federal securities laws.
10. The Use of Quality Controls - While a guideline most assuredly
should not undertake to set specific quality controls for law firms, it
should discuss generally the need for standardized procedures under
which opinions are prepared and reviewed.
11. The Drafting of Sample Forms - Since the form of opinion
letters as to these matters varies widely from firm to firm,9 sample
forms of opinion letters should be drafted and appended to the guide-
lines to encourage uniformity and thereby increased certainty of
meaning.2
In contrast to his posture in the opinion letter context, the securi-
ties lawyer as a draftsman or reviewer of the disclosure documents
required by the federal securities laws presently has no guidelines at
all to give him comfort in his desire to meet the expected level of
care. 3 The securities lawyer is frequently called upon to draft or
"Cf. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5094 (Oct. 24, 1970) (disclosure of counsel's
interest in registrant).
"ABA CODE, Canon 6, EC 6-1, 6-4, DR 6-101(A).
"°See text accompanying note 103 infra. cf. AICPA, STATEMENT ON AuDrmr STAN-
DARDS No. 4 (1974).
"The tendency of old line investment banking firms and law firms is to "set in
concrete" their style and form of opinions, particularly public offering opinions, and
to require others dealing with them to follow that form. Yet, surely the form is too
important in establishing what responsibility the opiner has assumed simply to accede
to the statement or proposition that "this form of opinion is what we always use." Cf.
Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
"rThis suggested technique was used in the Revised Exposure Draft setting forth
appropriate responses for lawyers to give to auditors' requests for information. 30 Bus.
LAW. 513, 533 (1975).
"rhe willful and knowing participation in the preparation or distribution of false
or misleading disclosure documents is clearly prohibited. This discussion is concerned
solely with the lawyer acting strictly as a lawyer who unwittingly participates in
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review 1933 Act prospectuses, offering circulars for securities or trans-
actions exempt from 1933 Act registration, 1934 Act reports, proxy
statements, annual reports and press releases. As a pragmatic mat-
ter, the techniques used today in drafting and reviewing these docu-
ments vary materially from firm to firm and in some cases from
partner to partner within a firm. The most uniformly applied tech-
niques are unquestionably those used to prepare prospectuses for
underwritten public offerings, where fairly standardized procedures
of due diligence have been generally established and well publicized
by the bar ever since the BarChris decision slammed home the need
to check the written record and to document all investigatory and
verification efforts. 4 No other disclosure document, however, begins
to receive the attention that the prospectus of an underwritten public
offering does. Since the responsibilities undertaken by the lawyers
who draft and review these other disclosure documents are increas-
ingly similar to those they have historically undertaken in the prepa-
ration of registration statements, affirmative guidelines should be
formulated to insure that the care exercised in drafting and reviewing
becomes more standardized and meets the expected level of care.
In formulating guidelines, the aim should not be to develop abso-
lutes but should be to provide in general terms a functional statement
of legal and professional responsibilities and the effects thereof as
applied to the lawyer's work as a draftsman or reviewer." Within that
general framework, certain fundamental concepts of due diligence
can and should be set forth, not as specific rules to be applied in every
case but as guidelines whose application to individual facts and cir-
cumstances must be considered in every situation. To engage in such
a task will require analytical and pragmatic consideration of the fol-
lowing major problem areas:
1. The Scope of the Lawyer's Engagement and the Extent of his
Attesting Function Thereunder - While unquestionably a lawyer
should be able to limit his obligation to act as an "independent audi-
drafting or reviewing a false or deficient disclosure document. See generally Small, The
Lawyer's Responsibility as a Draftsman, National Institute, supra note 4, at 81-89.
"Many institutes and seminars have focused on the requirements of Section 11 of
the 1933 Act and on the due diligencb techniques designed both to support the legal
opinions given in public offerings and to aid others in meeting their due diligence
defense provided by Section 11. See, e.g., Techniques of Due Diligence, P.L.I., COURSE
HANDBOOK No. 112 (1973).
"In this connection, it would seem prudent to borrow on the experience of the
accounting profession and to carefully consider the content and form of its generally
accepted auditing standards and procedures.
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tor" of the non-legal matters in disclosure documents," that limita-
tion should be adequately documented and communicated to his
client and in some cases to the public. Where the assumed duties are
so narrowly confined, he should not permit a contrary impression to
be created in the minds of either his client or the public, and thus
should be most careful about the manner in which his or his firm's
name is used in the disclosure document. Where he has so limited his
role to being simply a reviewer, as often is the case with respect to
an annual report on Form 10-Q, he should be freer to assume the
accuracy of the information given him than when he acts as a drafts-
man where he should generally have an attesting duty. Yet, even
where his role is so limited that no duty of independent investigation
is affirmatively assumed, he should not be able to ignore matters
which he knows or suspects to be erroneous or misleading and should
make further inquiry and investigation as to those matters. 7 At all
times, irrespective of the limited scope of his engagement, he should
maintain a high degree of skepticism; but, under no circumstances
should he be viewed as the guarantor of the accuracy or completeness
of the document, nor as one who relieves others of their responsibili-
ties and liabilities with respect thereto.
2. The Nature of a Required Legal Audit - Some degree of legal
audit should be required whenever the lawyer acts as primary drafts-
man of a disclosure document and may be required under certain
circumstances when he acts only as a reviewer. "Legal audit" is used
to describe the process of verifying or testing information provided by
the client or others and of independently investigating material fac-
tual matters.98 The extent of any legal audit should be determined by
the facts and circumstances of the situation faced by the lawyer and
should be viewed as a matter of professional judgment. Nevertheless,
"As to the legal matters contained in most disclosure documents, it is doubtful
that a lawyer could or should be able to limit his responsibilities. Similarly, the lawyer-
director may not be able to limit his verification or investigatory duties even with
respect to non-legal factual matters. Cf. Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp.
643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
"Judgment decisions will of course continue to pervade the actual investigation.
For examples of how courts can differ on the adequacy of such an investigation,
compare Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973)
with Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
"The concept of a "legal audit" is not new and has been urged as a prophylactic
procedure which should be done annually to determine the legal health of a business,
including whether further legal work needs to be done and whether the legal risks of
the business are being adequately determined and valued. See Brown, Legal Audit,
38 S.CAL.L.REv. 431 (1965).
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audit standards and procedures, including the enumeration of key
factors to be considered in determining the type and degree of investi-
gation or verification," should be developed.'" Sample check lists for
the various disclosure documents should also be developed to be used
not as the ultimate mechanical check but only as a skeletal format
within which any investigation or verification efforts may be struc-
tured.
3. Questions of Materiality - The lawyer as a draftsman or a re-
viewer must continually decide what matters are or are not material
and ripe for disclosure, and those decisions should be viewed as mat-
ters of professional judgment. Yet any set of standards and guidelines
developed by the bar should not ignore this critical problem area, but
rather should discuss in detail the relevant policies and the frame-
work within which these considered and independent judgments
should be made. 1'0
4. Duty to Correct - Where a disclosure document reviewed or
drafted by a lawyer contains a misleading or false material statement
which is later discovered to be so, the lawyer should take immediate
corrective steps. Similar corrective responsibilities may arise where
subsequent events occur which render statements in the disclosure
document false or misleading, and those circumstances which create
a duty to correct should be thoroughly discussed.
"Examples of some factors which might be included are the experience and history
of the client and of the attorney-client relationship, the type of industry or business
in which the client is engaged, the financial condition and prospects of the client, the
nature of the transaction and the degree of materiality of the matter under investiga-
tion or suspicion. Professional judgment should clearly be determinative of the appli-
cation and balancing of any such factors, but it is equally clear that such judgment
should be applied in an independent and objective fashion.
10 Such standards and procedures should cover the need for proper supervision and
review of the investigatory procedures and the results thereof. The importance of
compiling adequate documentation to afford reasonable support for the actions taken
should also be stressed. The files should leave no doubt as to why and what investiga-
tory or verifying steps were taken, the reasons for omitting or departing from any
standards or procedures set forth by the bar, and what facts and factors were consid-
ered in reaching the professional judgment decisions involved in the matter. Cf. SEC
v. National Student Marketing Corp., [1973-74 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED.SEc.L.REP. 94,610 (D.D.C. 1974) (law firm required to show its files where it is
a named defendant).
"IAs difficult as it may seem to establish materiality criteria, there is recent
precedent which indicates the type of useful discussion which could be included in a
set of standards or guidelines. See Financial Accounting Standards Board, Criteria for
Determining Materiality (Discussion Memorandum 1975), noted in BNA SEC.REG. &
L.REP. 297: D-1 (Apr. 9, 1975).
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5. The Concept of "Independence" - The concept of independence
is well developed for the accounting profession, but as applied to the
legal profession has generally been ignored or vehemently rejected as
being in direct conflict with the lawyer's duty of loyalty to his client.
Increasingly, however, the lawyer dealing with securities matters
which directly affect the public is expected to render objective judg-
ments, such as the "considered, independent opinion" called for by
Formal Opinion No. 335. Serious questions may be raised as to the
"independence" of counsel's judgment where he has a material stock
ownership or serves as a director at the request of a management.
By setting forth reasonable and objective standards for these and
other problem areas, the bar will exhibit the type of responsible pro-
fessional self-regulation which will establish levels of care that de-
mand respect from the Commission and the judiciary. Indeed, Com-
missioner Sommer has stated that "the Commission is not going to
sue lawyers because they make honest mistakes of judgment in good
faith,"'' 2 and compliance with such standards presumably would es-
tablish the requisite good faith. The courts should also react posi-
tively to such standards, certainly with respect to malpractice actions
which look solely to professional standards to determine culpability
and most likely with respect to actions based upon the federal securi-
ties laws under a "flexible duty" or any other test of culpability. To
be effective, however, the standards must not be self-serving, but
must balance objectively the relevant conflicting responsibilities and
ideally should reflect the input of the Commission and other inter-
ested parties. To gather that input, the technique of issuing exposure
drafts, as was done with respect to the formulation of lawyers' respon-
ses to auditors' requests, should be extensively used. Such responsi-
ble self-regulation will hopefully relieve the tensions which exist
today due to the inability of anyone, including the Commission and
the courts, to say with certainty what is and should be the appropri-
ate level of expectations in this area."03
'0 Sommer, The Commission and the Bar: Forty Good Years, 30 BuS.LAw. 5, 8
(1974). See also Remarks of Commissioner Pollack, SmTH ANNuAL INsTrrUTE ON SECURI-
TIES REGULATION (P.L.I. Nov. 7-9, 1974)..
'Equally important as the development of functional standards is the develop-
ment of effective enforcement techniques. Our profession has historically failed in
enforcing its professional standards and in instilling in its members the importance of
standards in their work. See ABA, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY
ENFORCEMENT (1970); ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNcrION AND THE
DEFENSE FUNCTION 10 (T.D. 1970). If the traditional means of sanctions through bar
committees and the courts cannot put the needed force behind the standards, other
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B. The Individual Bar and the Formulation of Guidelines
Irrespective of whether the organized bar formulates general
guidelines and standards in this area, individual members of the bar
and their firms should develop and maintain policies and procedures
which will insure that their work reaches the level of professional care
required to meet their responsibilities under the federal securities
laws. Thus, members of the individual bar should give serious atten-
tion to the development and maintenance of internal quality controls,
a concept used for years by the accounting profession to assure high
standards but one generally ignored by the legal profession.
1'
Law firms are highly individualistic and specific quality controls
should be tailored to the peculiar characteristics of a firm. However,
as a general proposition, most quality control procedures should be
aimed in at least three different directions. First, a control system
should have an internal focus to assure the maintenance of a high
level of professional competence in each lawyer. This system would
be primarily concerned with the selection process of new associates,
the training and supervision of associates and junior partners and the
continuing legal education'of each lawyer through his attendance at
institutes and seminars, his outside professional reading and his par-
ticipation in internal programs and communications which highlight
professional ethics and standards as well as new developments of
substantive law.
Equally important is the formulation of quality controls aimed
externally in the sense that they are designed to make certain that
the work actually produced for clients by the firm is of the highest
professional quality. Two of the most critical components of such
controls are the use of standard forms for opinion letters from which
deviation is permitted only upon the approval of certain partners,
and the effective use of internal review procedures which challenge
and verify the procedures used in reaching legal opinions or approving
disclosure documents. The verification process should include an in-
drastic measures such as the use of peer review programs and panels of independent
experts should be instituted to insure that professional practice is being conducted in
compliance with professional standards. Otherwise, we leave to the courts and the
Commission our own housekeeping chores. For the difficulties surrounding the concept
of voluntary peer review, see Andrews, "Peer Review Plan for Accounting Firms Loses
Only Volunteer in Disclosure Row", Wall St.J., March 24, 1975, at 18, col. 2.
"'See, e.g., Quality Control Considerations for a Firm of Independent Auditors,
AICPA STATSMENTS ON AuDrING STANDARDs No. 4, (1974); ALEXANDER GRANT & CoM-
PANY, QUALITY CONTROL (1974). For the only detailed analysis of the subject with
respect to the legal profession, see F. Wozencraft, Self-Policing by Law Firms, SIXTH
ANNUAL INSTITUTES ON SEcuRrrms REGULATION (P.L.I. Nov. 7-9, 1974).
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dependent review by a partner not directly (or indirectly through
stock ownership) connected with the client or particular deal.
The last and perhaps most important type of quality control con-
cerns the institution of policies and procedures designed to assure
that the firm is representing, and will continue to represent, "qual-
ity" clients whose integrity can be relied upon. Such procedures
should include internal reviews of all material new business by senior
lawyers and the periodic review of old business to discover and react
to any circumstances which have resulted in an erosion of a lawyer's
confidence in a particular client's integrity.
Obviously the investment of time and money required to imple-
ment and maintain a well-designed system of quality controls is sub-
stantial and even creates certain risks of liability in the event of a
failure to apply such controls to a situation which by hindsight in-
volved a violation of the federal securities laws. Yet such an invest-
ment should provide compensating benefits in improving and main-
taining the quality of professional service by providing a means to
substantiate the existence of due care in any administrative or judi-
cial proceeding which the Commission or any private litigant might
seek to institute.105
IV. CONCLUSION
The circumstances under which a securities lawyer practices
today are in a state of tumultuous change and uncertainty. While no
court has held that an attorney is liable to the investing public for
negligent acts performed solely as an attorney, storm clouds gener-
ated primarily by isolated dicta and Commission commentary and
proceedings surround the issue, and realistically the securities lawyer
must view such potential liability with seriousness and take all possi-
ble steps to assure that his conduct meets the requisite standard of
care. Since that standard of care has not been given shape or defini-
tion by formal guidelines, his conduct is presently guided wholly by
his best understanding of the informal and often conflicting peer
standards of the securities bar; and if his conduct is challenged in
In rhe instigation of quality controls by the law firm in the Jo Ferguson matter
apparently was the most significant factor in the Commission's determination to settle
the matter, with Ferguson receiving only a censure. See text accompanying note 59
supra. It should also be noted that in the National Student Marketing complaint the
Commission seeks to impose responsibility upon all the partners of a law firm for the
alleged misconduct of one partner; surely it would be helpful in defending against such
an attack if the firm could point to firm quality controls designed to minimize such
misconduct.
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court, he must rely upon the expert testimony of his peers to prove
to the court that his conduct under the facts and circumstances of
the particular case was that which society did expect, and should
have expected, from him.
The predominant theme of this article is that the legal profession
should act to provide guidance as to the appropriate level of expecta-
tions through the formulation of standards by which its members are
to be judged, much as the accounting profession has historically done.
By setting functional and balanced standards, the profession would
provide a healthy framework within which the securities lawyer could
practice with confidence and in which the Commission and the judi-
ciary, as well as the public, could place their confidences and thereby
their respect. To reach this goal, however, requires the bar to recog-
nize explicitly that lawyers, and particularly securities lawyers, do
have certain responsibilities to the public which from time to time
will conflict with the desires or interests of their clients. The balanc-
ing of these complex interests in a responsible and objective fashion
can only be achieved through vigorous debate over exposure drafts or
proposed standards by members of the bar, the Commission and
other interested parties, but it is the bar which should bear the ulti-
mate responsibility of giving shape and definition to the obligations
of its members. The costs of this undertaking will be extensive, but
the benefits will also be extensive not only for the individual practi-
tioner but also for the investing public. The profession should remem-
ber that it is not self-contained; but is only an instrument of society
to whose needs and interests it must be responsive.
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